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ARGUMENT IN REPLY 
The District Court Erred In Granting Ruggiero's Motion To Dismiss 
A. Introduction 
The district court granted Ruggiero's motion to dismiss based on its 
conclusion that the First Amendment prevented the state from prosecuting 
Ruggiero for preparing false evidence in violation of I.C. § 18-2602 since, 
according to the district court, "criminalizing a false or forged letter sent to a 
judge who is not ethically permitted to consider the ex parte communication for 
any reason punishes falsity alone and runs afoul of' the United States Supreme 
Court's opinion in United States v. Alvarez, 132 S.Ct. 2537 (2012). (R., pp.101-
102.) The state appealed, asserting the district court's conclusion in this regard 
is erroneous. 
In response, Ruggiero argues "the district court correctly dismissed this 
case on First Amendment grounds" because, he contends (1) "[t]he letters are 
not outside First Amendment protection"; (2) "[t]he letters did not threaten the 
integrity of the legal system in the same manner as perjury or impersonating a 
government official"; (3) "[c]riminalizing the letters is not 'actually necessary' to 
protect the integrity of the truth finding process"; and (4) "[a]pplication of I.C. § 
18-2602 to this case is controlled by Alvarez notwithstanding the differences 
between that statute and the Stolen Valor Act." (Brief of Respondent, pp.6-7, 9-
10 (bold omitted.)). Ruggiero also offers two alternative arguments in support of 
dismissal. First, Ruggiero asserts dismissal was proper because, he contends, 
the state presented insufficient evidence to support the magistrate's finding of 
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probable cause. (Brief of Respondent, pp.14-18.) Second, Ruggiero contends 
I.C. § 18-2602 is void for vagueness. (Respondent's Brief, pp.18-19.) All of 
Ruggiero's arguments lack merit. 
B. Dismissal Based On The First Amendment Was Improper 
In support of his claim that dismissal of the charges for preparing false 
evidence was proper, Ruggiero first contends, "contrary to the State's assertion, 
I.C. § 18-2602 does restrict expression because of its message - it restricts 
statements because they are false." (Respondent's Brief, p.7 (emphasis 
original).) Ruggiero is incorrect. Idaho Code § 18-2602 does not proscribe any 
particular content; it prohibits the preparation of false documents with the intent 
to have them introduced in certain proceedings. In the context of this case, the 
content of the letters written by Ruggiero is irrelevant; his crime was forging 
letters purporting to be from three different individuals and sending them to the 
court with the intent that the court consider them in relation to his criminal case. 
It is for this reason that, contrary to Ruggiero's claim, the Stolen Valor Act is not 
analogous. 
Unlike I.C. § 18-2602, the Stolen Valor Act expressly proscribes specific 
content - the representation that one has "been awarded any decoration or 
medal authorized by Congress for the Armed Forces of the United States." 18 
U.S.C. § 704(b). Because I.C. § 18-2602 does not "restrict expression because 
of its message, it ideas, its subject matter, or its content," Alvarez, 132 S.Ct. at 
2543, Ruggiero's preparation of false documents with the intent they be used to 
accomplish fraud or deceit in his criminal case was not protected by the First 
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Amendment. Accordingly, the state is not required, as Ruggiero claims, to 
"demonstrate that the letters' falsity was accompanied by a cognizable harm and 
that its chosen restriction on false statements is actually necessary to protect 
against harm." (Respondent's Brief, p.7.) 
Even if the state had such a burden, it is easily satisfied. The cognizable 
harm is protecting the integrity of the judicial system by preventing the 
introduction of false evidence and avoiding the expenditure of resources in 
investigating such evidence. That I.C. § 18-2602 authorizes punishment without 
a requirement that the evidence actually be introduced does not mean the 
statute is "unnecessary," much less an impairment on one's First Amendment 
rights. Ruggiero, however, claims that "counter-speech" is sufficient to prevent 
the harm. (Respondent's Brief, pp.9-10.) Specifically, he cites the "rules of 
evidence, judicial ethical canons and the prosecutor's ability to investigate" as 
mechanisms of "counter-speech" that "stood between the letters at issue and 
any cognizable harm." (Respondent's Brief, p.10.) Thus, apparently in 
Ruggiero's estimation, the First Amendment protects an attempt to undermine 
the judicial process even if it does not protect the completed act as is recognized 
in cases involving perjury. This distinction is unprecedented and illogical. There 
is no reasoned basis for concluding that preparing false evidence with the "intent 
to produce it, or allow it to be produced, for any fraudulent or deceitful purpose, 
as genuine or true, upon any trial, proceeding or inquiry whatever, authorized by 
law," I.C. § 18-2602, enjoys First Amendment protection, when perjured 
statements do not. Alvarez, 132 S.Ct. at 2546. Moreover, Ruggiero's argument 
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that "counter-speech" is adequate to prevent any harm ignores that part of the 
harm is the resources devoted to investigating the fraud. The district court erred 
in concluding the First Amendment required dismissing the charges against 
Ruggiero. 
C. There Was Sufficient Evidence At The Preliminary Hearing To Support 
The Magistrate's Probable Cause Determination 
As an alternative ground for affirming the dismissal of his charges, 
Ruggiero contends there was insufficient evidence to sustain the magistrate's 
probable cause determination. (Appellant's Brief, pp.14-18.) Ruggiero's claim 
fails. The state presented substantial evidence at the preliminary hearing from 
which the magistrate could find probable cause to bind Ruggiero over on three 
counts of preparing false evidence. 
"A magistrate's finding of probable cause to believe that a defendant has 
committed an offense should be overturned only upon a showing that the 
magistrate abused its discretion." State v. Reyes, 139 Idaho 502, 504, 80 P.3d 
1103, 1105 (Ct. App. 2003). When the appellate court reviews a discretionary 
decision it considers whether the district court (1) perceived the issue as one of 
discretion, (2) acted within the boundaries of such discretion and consistent with 
applicable legal standards, and (3) reached its decision by an exercise of reason. 
Id. (citation omitted). 
The purpose of the preliminary hearing is quite limited. State v. Williams, 
103 Idaho 635, 644-45, 651 P.2d 569, 578-79 (Ct. App. 1982), overruled on 
other grounds, State v. Pierce, 107 Idaho 96, 685 P.2d 837 (Ct. App. 1984). The 
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finding of probable cause must be based upon substantial evidence on every 
material element of the offense charged, and this test may be satisfied through 
circumstantial evidence and reasonable inferences to be drawn therefrom. 
Reyes, 139 Idaho at 504, 80 P.3d at 1105; State v. Munhall, 118 Idaho 602, 606, 
798 P.2d 61, 65 (Ct. App. 1990). The state is not required to produce all of its 
evidence at a preliminary examination. Carey v. State, 91 Idaho 706, 709, 429 
P.2d 836, 839 (1967). Rather, the state need only show that a crime was 
committed and that there is probable cause to believe the accused committed it. 
State v. Gibson, 106 Idaho 54, 57, 675 P.2d 33, 36 (1983) ("it is sufficient to 
state that the evidence produced by the State at the preliminary hearing 
established that a crime had been committed and a reasonable person would 
believe that Gibson had probably or likely participated in the commission of the 
offense charged"). Reviewing courts will not substitute their judgment for that of 
the magistrate as to the weight of the evidence and a probable cause finding will 
not be disturbed if any reasonable view of the evidence, including permissible 
inferences, support findings that the offense occurred and the accused 
committed it. State v. Holcomb, 128 Idaho 296, 299, 912 P.2d 664, 667 (Ct. 
App. 1995)). 
The state charged Ruggiero with three counts of violating I.C. § 18-2602 
based on the allegations that he prepared three false letters and mailed them to 
the magistrate presiding over the case in which the state charged Ruggiero with 
stalking in an "attempt[ ] to persuade the Judge" that the authors of the letters 
were witnesses in the case and "to persuade the Judge to dismiss the case 
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against [him]."1 (R., pp.42-43.) The elements of this offense required the state 
to prove there was probable cause to believe Ruggiero, on or about the date 
alleged, (1) prepared a "false or antedated book, paper, record, instrument in 
writing, or other matter or thing," (2) "with intent to produce it, or allow it to be 
produced, for any fraudulent or deceitful purpose, as genuine or true upon any 
trial, proceeding or inquiry whatever, authorized by law." I .C. § 18-2602. 
At the preliminary hearing, the prosecutor assigned to Ruggiero's stalking 
case testified that while that case was pending, she received a letter purportedly 
written by Ruggiero's stalking victim, Lisa. (P.H. Tr., p.7, L.14-p.12, L.12.) Lisa 
testified at the preliminary hearing and denied writing the letter. (P.H. Tr., p.52, 
L.20 - p.53, L.22.) Lisa also denied knowing Jenn Higginson, the alleged author 
of one of the letters, and denied having any knowledge that a Spearmint Rhino 
bouncer wrote a letter to Judge Watkins on her behalf. (P.H. Tr., p.56, Ls.15-
22.) 
Detective Angela Munson also testified. During her testimony, she 
explained that she interviewed Judge Watkins and requested certain documents 
from Ruggiero's stalking case. (P.H. Tr., p.22, L.15 - p.24, L.2.) Judge Watkins 
provided Detective Munson with the three letters he received that were 
1 In the Second Amended Complaint, the state alternatively alleged, on each 
count, that the letters were "false or forged" and were "filed with the clerk of the 
court in" Ruggiero's stalking case in violation of I.C. § 18-2601. (R., pp.32-35.) 
However, the Commitment and Information only alleged violations of I.C. § 18-
2602 and the language that the letters were submitted in an "attempt[] to 
persuade the Judge to dismiss the case." (R., pp.36-38, 41-43.) 
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purportedly written by Lisa, and the two other potential witnesses identified in the 
Complaint, Jenn Higginson and the "Spearmint Rhino Bouncer." (P.H. Tr., p.24, 
L.3 - p.27, L.20.) Next, Detective Munson interviewed Ruggiero and confronted 
him with the three letters. (P.H. Tr., p.28, L.3 - p.35, L.5.) Detective Munson 
testified that Ruggiero initially denied writing the letters but ultimately admitted he 
wrote the letters in an effort to "get out of trouble." (P.H. Tr., p.32, L.20 - p.35, 
L.5; p.47, L.3 - p.49, L.25.) 
Ruggiero called his brother, Maximilian, to testify at the preliminary 
hearing. Maximilian testified that Ruggiero does not have a computer or a printer 
and denied ever seeing Ruggiero use a computer (P.H. Tr., p.59, L.13 - p.60, 
L.2.) Maximilian, however, acknowledged that he would not know whether 
Ruggiero used a computer at a different location, such as a library or somebody 
else's home. (P.H. Tr., p.63, Ls.14-22.) 
At the conclusion of evidence, Ruggiero argued the state failed to "offer[ ] 
substantial evidence that [he] wrote these letters at all," noting that Lisa did not 
imow who wrote them and Maximilian never saw him use a computer. (P.H. Tr., 
p.65, L.25 - p.66, L.9.) Ruggiero also argued that, even assuming the 
allegations were true, he could not be charged with a crime because the letters 
"were not offered into evidence whatsoever" and "there was no trial, proceeding, 
inquiry, or investigation." (P.H. Tr., p.66, L.17 - p.67, L.1.) 
The magistrate rejected Ruggiero's arguments and concluded there was 
sufficient evidence to bind him over on three counts of violating I.C. § 18-2602. 
(P.H. Tr., p.74, L.24 - p.77, L.1.) After he was bound over, Ruggiero renewed 
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his argument that there was insufficient evidence presented at the preliminary 
hearing. (R., pp.60-68.) Because the district court dismissed the charges based 
on its First Amendment analysis, it did not rule on Ruggiero's claim that the 
evidence presented at the preliminary hearing was insufficient to bind him over. 
Ruggiero, however, renews this argument on appeal as an alternative basis for 
affirming the district court's order. Specifically, Ruggiero asserts the evidence 
was insufficient to establish probable cause because, he asserts, "there was no 
substantial evidence to find that [he] intended the correspondence to be 
produced and relied on as evidence during a proceeding." (Brief of Respondent, 
pp.17-18.) Ruggiero's argument fails. 
The construction and application of a statute are questions of law over 
which the appellate court exercises free review. State v. Locke, 149 Idaho 641, 
642, 239 P.3d 34, 35 (Ct. App. 2010) (citing State v. Reyes, 139 Idaho 502, 505, 
80 P.3d 1103, 1106 (Ct. App. 2003)). "The interpretation of a statute 'must begin 
with the literal words of the statute; those words must be given their plain, usual, 
and ordinary meaning; and the statute must be construed as a whole."' Verska 
v. St. Alphonsus Regional Medical Center, 151 Idaho 889, 893, 265 P.3d 502, 
506 (2011) (quoting State v. Schwartz, 139 Idaho 360, 362, 79 P.3d 719, 721 
(2003). '"If the statute is not ambiguous, this Court does not construe it, but 
simply follows the law as written."' kL 
Although not entirely clear, it appears Ruggiero's argument focuses on 
what constitutes "any trial, proceeding or inquiry whatever, authorized by law" for 
purposes of I.C. § 18-2602 and a related assertion that there was no evidence 
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that he had the intent to have the letters produced as "evidence" at any 
"proceeding" - only evidence that he had an intent to correspond with the judge 
(apparently using other people's names). (See Brief of Respondent, p.17.) First, 
Ruggiero cannot seriously contend that a criminal case is not a "proceeding" 
"authorized by law" as contemplated by I.C. § 18-2602. Second, the fact that 
Ruggiero sent the letters to the presiding judge in his criminal case is evidence of 
his intent to have the letters produced in that proceeding. The state's evidence, 
at the preliminary hearing, was more than adequate to support a finding of 
probable cause. Ruggiero's claim to the contrary is without merit. 
D. Idaho Code § 18-2602 Is Not Void For Vagueness 
In addition to his First Amendment and insufficient evidence arguments, 
Ruggiero also asserted I.C. § 18-2602 as a grounds for dismissal. (R., pp.88-
90.) As with his insufficient evidence argument, the district court did not decide 
whether the statute is unconstitutionally vague. (See generally R., pp.99-102.) 
Ruggiero, however, advances that argument on appeal as a second alternative 
basis for affirming the order of dismissal. (Brief of Respondent, pp.18-19.) As 
with his other arguments, Ruggiero's void for vagueness claim fails. 
The constitutionality of a statute is a question of law over which the 
appellate court exercises free review. Doe Iv. Doe, 138 Idaho 893, 903, 71 P.3d 
1040, 1050 (2003). "A statute may be void for vagueness if it fails to give 
adequate notice to people of ordinary intelligence concerning the conduct it 
proscribes, or if it fails to establish minimal guidelines to govern law enforcement 
or others who must enforce the statute." State v. Fluewelling, 150 Idaho 576, 
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578, 249 P.3d 375, 377 (2011) (quoting State v. Korsen, 138 Idaho 706, 712, 69 
P.3d 126, 132 (2003)). "A statute may be challenged as unconstitutionally vague 
on its face or as applied to a defendant's conduct." State v. Korsen, 138 Idaho 
706, 712, 69 P.3d 126, 132 (2003), abrogated on other grounds by Evans v. 
Michigan, 133 S.Ct. 1069 (2013) (holding that a trial court's erroneous 
requirement of an extra element of the charged offense constitute an acquittal for 
purposes of double jeopardy). "For a facial vagueness challenge to be 
successful, the complainant must demonstrate that the law is impermissibly 
vague in all of its applications. In other words, the challenger must show that the 
enactment is invalid in toto." 19.:. (quotations and citation omitted). "To succeed 
on an as applied vagueness challenge, a complainant must show that the 
statute, 'as applied' to the defendant's conduct, failed to provide fair notice that 
the defendant's conduct was proscribed or failed to provide sufficient guidelines 
such that the police had unbridled discretion in determining whether to arrest 
him." 1st "A 'facial vagueness' analysis is mutually exclusive from an 'as applied' 
analysis" 1st (citation omitted). "It has long been held that a statute should not 
be held void for uncertainty if any practical interpretation can be given the 
statute." State v. Larsen, 135 Idaho 754, 756, 24 P.3d 702, 704 (2001). 
Although Ruggiero did not expressly indicate in his motion to dismiss 
whether he was asserting a "facial" or "as applied" challenge to I.C. § 18-2602, it 
appears, based on the standards he recited, that he claimed the statute is vague 
as applied to his conduct, which is the argument he asserts on appeal. (R., 
pp.89-90; Brief of Respondent, p.19.) Below, Ruggiero argued (1) the statute 
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"only lists four specific instruments and then purports to include any 'other matter 
or thing,' thereby extending the purview of th[e] statute so that its prohibitions are 
not clearly defined," and (2) the language "upon any trial, proceeding, or inquiry 
whatever" is vague. (R., pp.89-90.) On appeal, Ruggiero only pursues the 
second argument and asserts: 
The magistrate construed the phrase in 'any trial proceeding 
or inquiry whatever' as including the intent to produce it somewhere 
in the case and have someone rely on it. Such an interpretation 
fails to give adequate notice to people of ordinary intelligence 
concerning the conduct I.C. § 18-2602 proscribes and fails to 
establish minimal guidelines to govern law enforcement or others 
who must enforce the statute. The void for vagueness doctrine 
prohibits this very process because of the inevitable danger of 
arbitrary and discriminatory application when police officers, judges 
and juries are granted the freedom to make subjective 
determinations regarding what exactly a statute means because 
the prohibited criminal conduct is not worded with sufficient clarity. 
(Brief of Respondent, p.19.) 
This argument fails for several reasons. First, a magistrate is not tasked 
with giving notice to the general public regarding the meaning of a statute and, 
even if a defendant thought a magistrate or district judge interpreted a statute 
incorrectly, an erroneous interpretation would not render the statute vague. 
Second, whether a statute is void for vagueness is ultimately a question for this 
Court to decide regardless of how it was interpreted by the lower court. Doe I, 
138 Idaho at 903, 71 P.3d at 1050. Third, contrary to Ruggiero's argument, the 
void for vagueness analysis does not evaluate the "danger of arbitrary and 
discriminatory application" by "judges and juries" - it evaluates whether the 
challenged statute provides fair notice of what conduct is proscribed and whether 
it provides sufficient guidelines so that the police do not have "unbridled 
11 
discretion in determining whether to arrest." Korsen, 138 Idaho at 712, 69 P.3d 
at 132. Fourth, and most importantly, I.C. § 18-2602 is not vague as applied to 
Ruggiero's conduct because the statute provides fair notice that it would be 
illegal for Ruggiero to prepare false documents with the intent that they be 
produced in his criminal proceeding "as genuine or true" for a "fraudulent or 
deceitful purpose," which would include having his criminal case dismissed 
based on false evidence. Further, there is nothing in the language of I.C. § 18-
2602 that gives police unbridled discretion in deciding whether to arrest an 
individual for this offense. Ruggiero has failed to provide any cogent argument 
demonstrating otherwise. Ruggiero's claim that this Court should affirm the 
dismissal of his case on the alternative ground that I.C. § 18-2602 is vague as 
applied to his conduct is without merit. 
Because there was no valid basis for dismissing the Information charging 
Ruggiero with three counts of violating I.C. § 18-2602, the district court's Order 
Re: Motion to Dismiss should be reversed. 
CONCLUSION 
The state respectfully requests that this Court reverse the district court's 
Order Re: Motion to Dismiss and remand this case for further proceedings. 
DATED this 10th day of July 2013. 
Deputy Attorney General 
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